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Chusnul Hajati
The Tragedy of Cimareme:
The Resistance of Haji Hasan to the Colonial
Power in l9I9
Abstraksi: Sejarah mencdtdt *Peristizpa Cirnarerne" sebagai sakh satu
hejadian pmting sepanjang tahun 1919 Indonzsia. Peristiua ini merupakan
puncak perhwanAn masyarakat Dua Cinareme, yang drpimpin oleh Haji
Hasan, mehuan pemerinuh holonial Beknda. Terhitung tujuh orang
mmingal, termasuk Haji Hasan sendiri, danpuluhan kinnrya luka berat
sma ringan. Selurub korban fuasal dari pihak priburni, dan tidak seorang
pun dzri pihah pernuintzh yang trlukz^ Dari sisi jurnlah horban dan renung
uaktu, Peristiua Cimareme trbikng kecil dan hka.l. Narnun pmgaruhr4ta
sangdt luas; pernerinuh pusat dan rnedia massa rasional rnengangkatnya
sebagai tema babasan yang menyita perhatian banyak pihah. ktilah
Cimareme dinmbil dzri nama dcsa ternpat kejadian, yang sekarang masuk
dakm Kecamatan Banyuresmi, Kabupatm Garut,Jaw.u Barat.
Pernicu utama Peristiua Cimarente lzbih busifat hepmtingan ehonomis.
Setahun sebelum hqad.ian tersebut mebtus, pemerinah kolonial Beknda
mmeupkzn aturan Wbelian padi bagi petani pribumi. Langkah ini diarnbil
untuk rnengatasi hekngkaan bahan makanan akibat hegagakn pdnen sertd
hesulitan imp or. Selama beberapa tah un se be lurnnya, ui la.yab -uilay ab
pruninn di seluruh puku Jaua sering rnmgakmi kegagakn pdnen akibat
musim kemarau yang berkepanjangan. Saat itu pemerintab nTengdtdsinya
dzngan cara m.mgintpor beras dari ailayah kin di Asia. Namun upaya ini
tidah berjakn mulus, karena sekin hesuliun transpottdsi, zailaltah-zuilayab
tersebut juga mmgakmi hegagakn panen.
Aturan pembelian pad.i yang diteupkan pemerinah dipandang tidak
ad.il olzh Haji Hasan. Pemerinab rnatajibhanpeani di wilzyab kin untuh
haryta mmjual padi mereha sebanyak dua pikul per bau tanah, se?nentara
peuni Cimareme diharuskan mmjual padi mereka dua kali lebib banyak
dari angka tersebut. Haji Hasan mempertanyakzn aturan ini, dan bersiheras
untuh, tidah menjual padinya kepada pernerintab. Sihap ini kemudian
menirnbulkan konflik dcngan pejabat pribumi setempdt, dan ahhirnya
pemerintab Belandz rnmgambil tindakan kerds meklui penyerbuan.
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Ranghaian hejad.ian Pqistiua Cimarerne harrya bukngsung singhat.
Tazpi kk ditilik ahar persoalannya, puistiua ini merupakan sebuah jalinan
dari pelbagai macarn konflik yang sebelurnnya sudah muncul. Secara
ekonornis Haji Hasan trgolong ordng tTMrnPu Ia memiliki unah yang sangat
luas untuk uhuran peuni desa Ia juga muniliki waha kin, wperti petemakn'n
huda danpuikarnn air darat. Dihitungdari seluruh jumlah hekzyaanrrya,
a.tura.n pembelian padi tidah akan barryak nTengd.ngu hebcrlangsungan
kehidupan ekonominy a. D mgan dnnikian, hepmtingan ekonomis harty alah
sahb satu sisiuajah dari Pqistiwa Cimareme ini.
Konflik Haji Hasan dengan pejabat pribumi merupakan sisi kin dari
keseluruhan honflih. Haji Hasan pada dasarryt a mendudabi posisi sosial y ang
sama dengan pejabat priburni. Keduanya adal^ah elit desa yang masing-masing
maniliki pmgarub baar terbadap rafoiat. Bedanya, sehhu pernim.pin dgd.nw,
Haji Hnan tidak mendapatkan legitimasi fonnal dari pemerinuh. Tarik'
menarik pmgaruh anurkedua jmis kepemirnpinan muncul dahrn bentuk
perselisiban anara Haji Hasan dazgan Lurah Cikmdal dzn lVedzna Lelcs.
SQah muda Haji Hasan tnemang sudah menunjukkan siknp radikal.
Sebagai keturunan bangsauan dan byai, sejak muda ia sudah terlibat
perrnusuban dengan pejabat Behnda. Olch orang tuanya Hasan dikirim he
padntren, dan diharapkan dzpat mmgantikan hedudukan ayahnrya sebagai
seord.ng byai. Namun hetika ayabrrya mminggal, Hasan tarnpdk hurang
tqtarik dcngan tugas yang dibebankan sebagai pemuka aga.rr7a. Ia lzbih
tcrtarih untuk rnendakmi ilntu kesaktian dan rnmgQarkannya h,epada para
santri dan masyarakat setem.pat. Ia juga mernobilisasi petani dengan
men"dirikan organisasi sep ak bo k y ang bersemangatkan h,emerde kaan.
Meklui selurult hegiatan tersebut, Haji Hasan muncul sebagai sosok,
pemimpin yang berpengarub. Sebagai petinggi pesantren, ia mudah
mudap atkzn dukungan massa dan lzgitimasi keaganann Hal itu tercerrnin
manahala ia mengunakan istilah "perang sabil" ketika mengadakan
perhuanan terbadap pemqinub Beknda. Lebib dz.ri itu, meklui kekayaan
y ang ia miliki, p mgaruhny a j uga dap at mmj angkau para peani yang bekerj a
untuknya. Berdasarkan dukungan sertd posisi ini, Haji Hassan terlibat
mamp u rnmgadakan per kutanan, mes hipun kemudian ka.kh.
Peristiua Cintarente hanyalah salah satu peristian dari rangkaian
kejad.ian hinyangsudab berlakn seklurnrrya. Padz awtal abad. duapuluh,
misalrryta, tercdtzt beberdpd peristiwa serupayangmeletus di sekitar uilayah
Jazoa Barat. Maka tidak berlebiban jiha dikatakan bahzaa peristiua ini
rnerupakan cerminan dari situasi sosial- politih ma.syarakat Jaua pada
urnunTnyd.
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his article attempts to 
^nelyza 
the resistance of Haji Hasan
against the Dutch colonial government in 1919. The event
itself is known as the Cimareme tragedy, as this movement
was launched in a small enclave, Cimareme, in which Hasan resided.
Cimareme was located in the village of Cikendal, Leles sub-district,
Garut district, Priangan residence, \fest Java.1 Cimareme is now lo
cated in the village of Sukasari, Bannrresmi sub-district, Garut dis-
trict, 'West Java province. The roots of the incidence were mainly
triggered by Hasan's conflict with local officers of the lurah (village
head) of Cikendal and the anedana (sub-district head) of Leles, con-
cerning the implementation of the government's policy on rice buy-
ing. This policy was made by the colonial government as a step to
prevent famine due to harvest failures during 1918. The Cimareme
tragedy started in April 7919 and reached its climax on7 Jdy t919,
when a fully armed squad of police and army shot dead Hasan and
his followers. The tragedy occurred relatively quickly, but its impli-
cations were far-reaching. It appears that the impact of the tragedy
, was influential in the indigenous society as well as on the colonial
government itself. On this basis, the Cimareme tragedy deserves an
indepth historical evaluation.
Java at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth
century was very much colored by various indigenous unrests, rebel-
lions and resistances against the colonial power. Although some of
these took the form of religious or political movements, almost all of
them appeared to respond to the unjust social situation2. Peasant re-
bellion, for instance, was basically economic, but it surfaced in terms
of religious conflict. Historical records show that, prior to the
Cimareme tragedy, similar rebellions had already taken place in'West
Java, such as in Ciomas in 1886, Cilegon in 1888 and Gedangan in
1904.3 Many themes had been elaborated in these movements, in-
cluding protests against government policies of high taxation, exces-
sive levies and forced labor mobilization.
The outburst of movements generally displayed distinctive char-
acteristics concerning their leadership patterns, organizational forms
and ideological characters. Peasant movements, for instance, are usu-
ally classified as archaic because of their simple organization, pro-
grams and tactics. Their ideology is revealed by certain eschatological
views which manifest themselves in terms of milleniarism, messianism,
nativism, holy war and revivalism.a Each ideology often directly re-
flects the main goal of the movement. Milleniarism assumes the com-
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ing of a golden age to replace social in.fustices, unrests, conflicts and
miseries. Almost in parallel, messianism exPects the coming of a ratu
adil, "just king" or messiah, who is going to create a sound and pros-
perous society. Some social movements tend to be nativistic in char-
acter: reviving indigenous values and rejecting all foreign influences.
Vithin the religious sphere such an idea is reflected in terms of reviv-
alism which attempts to revive old values and religious piety within
the present situation. To some extent, the idea of. perang sabil (holy
war) strengthens the effectivity of these ideologies. Taking measures
towards the colonial government is not only construed as an eco-
nomic principle, but also a religious calling of fighting against the
knfir $nfidels).5 To a large extent, Haj Hasan's resistance falls into
this latter c tegory.
The tragedy of Cimareme is also called the Cimareme affair
(Peristiwa Cimareme) or the Garut affair, as contained in the rePorts
and documents of the Dutch Indies colonial government. As a social
movement, it is interesting to analyze it from a historical point of
view. To date the affair has not been anaLytically dealt with, even
though it has been mentioned in passing in some historical writings.
The multiple dimensions of the Cimareme tragedy deserves a specific
investigation in order to gain a sufficient impression of the aff.air.
The Regulation on Rice Buying
The early seeds of the Cimareme tragedy basically originated from
a food policy determined by the colonial government in Bandung,
'WestJava, on 12 March 1919. Among the responsible parties involved
in this policy were the Director of Farming, S. Mulder, the Resident
of Priangan, farming experts and members of the Food Stock Com-
mission.6 They investigated the possibility of making a government
decision in response to the decreasing stock of rice and to Prevent the
risk of starvation. In order to meet the demand for rice and the
distribution of paddy rice, especially to those outside Java, the meet-
ing decided to mobilize rice buying from farmers.T
In relation to this decision, on 26 March l9l9 the head of the
Priangan Residence sent a circular to all Resident assistants about the
regulation of rice buying. The circular constituted an order to quickly
mobilize rice buying in their respective areas.s Resident assistants
forwarded the order to the bupatis (district heads) to be passed to the
uedanas, while the latter directly mobilized the farmers through the
lurahs of all areas. The amount of rice to be bought was based on the
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amount of farm land possessed by each individual farmer. In general
a farmer had to sell one pihuP of paddy rice from each bauta of farm
land that he possessed. Yet, those who possessed fertile wet-rice land
had to sell a maximum of three pikul from each bau, compared to
one pikul and a maximum of one and half pikul for one bau of less
fertile land.
This regulation was valid for all areas, except for the farmers in
the Garut district. Garut farmers, including Cimareme, had to sell
their rice on quantities of at least four pikul from each bau of land,
provided that they owned five bau or more, Only for those who
possessed less than half a bau, was the rule on rice purchasing aban-
doned. The government price for each pikulwas 4.5 guilders, which
was to be paid in cash. Compared to the aver^ge price in the com-
mon market, the government price was lower. The market price
was between 4 - 6 guilders per pikul in Cikalongkulon and Ciamis; 6
- 8 guilders in Cirebon and Majalengka;l1 and 7.5 guilders in the mar-
kets of Priangan Residence.l2
The transaction was to be conducted in public centers, such as
village offices, sub-districts, districts, train stations or rice-mills. To
implement the regulation, the government created a special commit-
tee for rice buying down to the village level. The zo edanahadto present
a list of the amount of rice to be bought ten days before the begin-
ning of a new month, while the lurah had to submit such a list bi-
monthly. The transport costs from the fields to the transaction sites
were the farmers' own responsibility. If they failed to convey rhe
rice, they had to sell it to the surrounding markets or shops.
In spite of this purchasing, rice stock was also accumulated by
confiscation. Each family was only allowed to retain a maximum of
threepihul of rice. The government would confiscate rice from those
who stored rice more than this amount and fined them 100 guilders.13
Traders who retained more rice than the allowed amount were also
fined. The government accelerated the process of accumulation and
distribution through the allocation of 5,000 guilders for each sub-
district.la This was the government policy on food stock made be-
tween 1918-1919.
To implement the regulation, the uedana of Leles made an order
to all farmers in his area to sell the required amounr of rice ro the
government. To everyone's surprise, no farmers made any complaints,
except Haji Hasan who gave the uedana and lurab of Cikendal a hard
time. Hasan refused to receive the down-payment for 4lpikulof paddy
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rice from his 10 bau of land, instead replying that he was only willing
to sell l0 pihul. Hasan's response made these officers furious, and
they threatened to take the case to the higher level of government
officers. They also threatened Hasan with bringing an army squad
for the confiscation of all his wealth. Unfortunately, this threat did
not make Hasan step back and, ironically, he became more deter-
mined to hold onto his principles.
Having realized that the local officers had refused his proposal,
Hasan sent a letter to the resident assistant on 24 April 1919. He
asked the assistant to reconsider rhe amount of rice to be sold in
Cimareme given that other areas applied such a different and more
moderate regulation. He also questioned whether the regulation,
which was applied in Cimareme and the penalry for rejecting it, as
mentioned by local officers, were really government policy. He ex-
plained that his willingness to sell only 10 pikul was because all 84
members of his family were completely dependent on this land. At
this time he experienced harvest failures while at the same time the
rice plants were often infected by diseases. In such a situation, his
land could not fully support the huge demands of his family.15
Hasan's proposal was only conveyed to the resident assistant on
10 May 1919. The assistant himself still persisted with the regulation
and turned down Hasan's request. He then ordered the wedana of
Leles to convey this decision,l6 although the latter did not dare ro
face Hasan directly.lT Meanwhile, Hasan was waiting anxiously for
the reply. He asked his son-in-law, Haji Rasadi, and his neighbor,
Haji Kadir, to come before rhe lurab and the uedana inMay I9L9.
They failed to get the required information, because the two officers
only expressed their anger. This situation brought about more con-
cern for Hasan that the threat of the wedana was going to be ex-
ecuted. Thus, he sent his other son-in-law, Haji Malsuri, to the resi-
dent assistant in Garut to ask for the response to his proposal. It was
unfortunate that Maksuri failed ro meer the resident assistant as rhe
latter was not available.
In the meantime the uedana received information from his secre-
t^ry that Hasan had not changed his opinion. He also heard that
Hasan had already mobilized his followers and accumulated weap-
ons to fight against the government which would confiscate his rice.18
Therefore, he sent a letter on 25 June I9l9 to the bupati of Garut
confirming this informarion.le According ro rhe bupati, as mentioned
in his letter to the resident assisrant. such a dissident deserved harsh
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punishment.2o Based on this report, on 3 July 1919 the assistant resi-
dent decided to arrest Hasan the next day, using the support of a
police squad from Tasikmalaya.
- 
In the absence of a reply, Hasan again sent a letter to the resident
assistant on 4 July 19t9. He expressed his admiration and submission
to all government officers, including theuedanaandlurab,who were
going to seize his wealth.2l Regardless of this expression, he had basi-
cally prepared himself to face all possible action from the govern-
ment-His followers began to wear amulets which were believed to
increase their bravery and to protect their bodies against weaPons.
Hasan also distributed white fabric to function as a war uniform and
coffin to be used for the burial ceremony if anyone died in the struggle.
The deceased's body would not necessarily be covered by a new cof-
fin as this costume was also to function as a coffin. Each person re-
ceived six meters of fabric to be made into a long shirt called a iubah
(coat).22 Coincidentally, this event occurred in the month of Ramadan,
in which Muslim communities focused their attention on spiritual
activities. Such a moment was.very conducive to firing uP the Mus-
lims in the spirit of. anti-ka,frr as well as for the dissemination of the
idea of perang sabil. Religious gatherings, such as night Prayers
(taraueh) during the month of RamadAn, became effective moments
to express the grudges of the masses.23
ihe bupati, the resident assistant, the controller and 20 armed
police officers finally went to Cimareme to meet Hasan on Friday 4
luly L9 19 . On behalf of the government' the bup ati explained in length
the intention of the government in making the regulation on rice
buying. Hasan was quite surprised as the way the bupati explained
the problem was different from the uedana's attitude. He used this
opportunity to express his aversion to the wedana,whom he called Si
Jendil (it. moles on eyelid), instead of his real name.24 He uncovered
the attitude of the uedana before the officers, while explaining the
reason for his rejection of the regulation. Unfortunately, Hasan's
request was not reconsidered, these officers rejected it outright.
The two parties did not reach a satisfactory deal. The officers were
of the opinion that they could not give any privileges to Hasan,
since all farmers obeyed the government order.25 At the same time,
the resident assistant felt that he had had a bad time during the meet-
ing: he was overwhelmed by the Presence of a crowd around Hasan's
house. The fact was that the meeting coincided with Friday Prayers'
in which Muslims gather together to conduct a communal service.
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Some people wore long shirts which are usually worn in other Is-
lamic religious rituals. Such a phenomenon, however; gaYe the im-
pression to the resident assistance that Hasan was ready to fight against
the existing government. This meeting took place in a very tense
atmosphere, even though it did not involve any violent acts. All the
government officers agreed to postpone Hasan's arrest' giving him
an opportunity to reevaluate his opinion during the next three days.
In the following days, a rumor was circulated in Cimareme that
the government had made an apology to Hasan. This presumably
might have been an unexpected consequence of the postponed ar-
rest. Belief in the potent power of amulets, for instance, increased as
the government was regarded as having retreated. Three days was
sufficient to turn the people's anxiety into the potential power of
radicalism. However, on 6 July I9L9, the bupati sent a letter to the
resident assistant, telling him that there were some bad indications in
Hasan's resistance: a crowd of people in white shirts had proclaimed
a holy war in Hasan's house. As a consequence, the resident assistant
requested the resident to ask for military back up to the army com-
mander in Cimahi, Bandung. Forty soldiers under the command of
Lieutenant Hillen and 30 police officers under Commander Raes fi-
nally went to Garut on Sunday 6 July t9t9 to supPort the govern-
ment operation the following day.26
The operation of Hasan's detention was conducted on 7 Jdy 1919.
The delegation of indigenous officers was divided into two Parties.
The first group consisted of the vicelupati,theraedanas ofBttngbulang
and Tarogong, the penghulu (head of religious affairs) of Garut and
two police agents. The second group consisted of the vice penghulu, a
Garut religious adviser, the wedanas of Kadungora and Nangkaruka,
six police agents and two government trwted'hajjls.27 This delega-
tion, which s/as supported by a police squad under Commander Raes,
arrived in Cimareme before the delegation of the Priangan resident,
which was backed up by the soldiers under the command of Major
Van der Bie.
As they arrived in Cimareme, the vice bupati ordered Hasan out
of his house. Hasan went out to the yard followed by Gadjali and 13
other people. There were about 40 people in the yard, all of them
wearing long white shirts and carrying traditional weaPons such as
axes, daggers and curved blades, while no one was found to be hiding
rifles.28 The vice bupati started to speak to Hasan politely and asked
him to come along with him to the town of Garut to resolve his
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problem. F{asan replied that he and his followers would not surren-
der to the government. 'While the vice bupati continued to try to
convince Hasan, officer Darga tried to grab a weapon carried by one
of Hasan's followers. The people around the place automatically raised
up ready to fight. It was quite fortunate that the vice bupati could
handle the situation. He ordered them to enter the house and take
off their white clothes, but only some of them obeyed him.2e
Yice bupati continued to speak to Hasan and his followers. How-
ever, they replied that they were about to undertake a holy war,
because theaxdana of Leles wanted to confiscate their wealth. As the
dialogue between the two parties was going on, the resident of
Priangan delegation arrived at the site. They entered Hasan's yard,
except for the soldiers who waited in the nearby village street.3o At
this rnoment the crowd increased to about 1,000-1,500 people, but
no one v/as seen carrying weapons.3l The resident asked the bupatito
question the intention of Hasan's confrontation. Again, Hasan did
not say a word. He left the place and entered the house followed by
all the people, except Gadjali, who was detained by an officer. He
closed all the doors and windows and started to chant dhikr (remem'
brance of God) from inside the house. The Bupati made a last-ditch
attempt to ask Hasan to come out of the house. He even used Gadjali
to deliver the message three times. Hasan only came out of the house
once, but he said nothing and quickly returned inside. All the win-
dows and doors were dghtly locked.32
Hasan and his followers chanted dhikr together amidst the shouts
of orders to come out of the house. Maior Van der Bie was of the
opinion that the greater amount of time given, the worse the safety
of the officers might become. Chanting voices were getting higher
and higher. Finally, the resident ordered the commander to arrest
them by any means necessary, including, if required, the use of fire-
arms.33 As a warning, the police shot their guns over the roof of the
house. The dbibr chant continued in higher tones, without caring
about the order yelled by the bupati. The second shots were then
executed, but there was sdll no reply from the house except the sound
of the dhikr chanr. The third round of shots were then directed to-
wards the house several times. The chanting stopped and,all was
still. A view seconds afterwards, people heard children and women's
cries. 3a The last shots were ordered to be directed at the doors and
windows of the house, which were believed to be the sites of hiding.
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The resident then ordered the soldiers and police to break into
the house by force. lwomen and children *ere asked to leave the
house, but no one obeyed the order. Only after Major Van der Bie
and his squad, together with the police entered the house, were all
the unwounded people forced to leave. According to the governmenr
reports, there were only four dead, including Hasan, and,2O people
were wounded. All the victims were found to be holding daggers and
amulets to their bodies. Hasan himself was shot precisely in ihe head,
in which his amulet was located.35 However, other sorrrces maintained
that the number of victims was seven: Hasan, Bakar, Intasim, Sukanta,
Engko, Udin and Saedi. Bakar's body was taken away by the soldiers
and his burial site is not known to this day.s rhe governmenr re-
p9T..d that they detained 25 people; meanwhile Cimareme people
said that the total number was 36, of which 33 were iailed and 3 were
released.3T
Pribumi, Guntai and Batur
Seen simply, the tragedy of Hasan and his followers was an eco-
nomic and local problem. on the one hand, the colonial govern-
ment wanted the farmers to sell their paddy rice and Hasan suffered
from this policy. However, it seems that the cimareme tragedy was
not only about economic and local quests. After the o.rtburit, indig-
:n9us people in this area did nor sray aw^y. Attempts to launch re-bellions against the government intensified. The model of the move-
ment was no longer archaic, adopting traditional channels, but in-
stead adopted more sophisticate d organization. The Afdeling B move-
ment' for instance, which was identified by the government in the
aftermath of the tragedy, organizedits actions through carefully con-
trolled secret communications. The scope of the 
-orr..rr"nt stretchedto all areas of \flest Java. The government itself was curious as ro
whether Hasan had been involved in this movemenr. This assump-
tion was based on evidence that some of Hasan's followers *.r. i'
fact involved in the Afdeling B movemenr. However, no historical
records show that Hasan was involved in this secret organization.
The sequence of the Cimareme tragedy did not cease with the
death of Hasan and his close followers. The volksraad (the people's
Representative) paid full attention to these bloody affairs. Naiion-
wide newspapers focused their repons on the cimareme tragedy for
several days. As a resuk, the government doggedly createJ a f.act-
finding ream;led by P. de Roo de la Faille, tolnrrestigate the proce-
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dural requirements of Hasan's execution.3s The team was sent to the
field to collect data on the tragedy. The government also sent Dr.
G.AJ. Hazeu, a government adviser for the indigenous and Arab
affairs, to investigate the religious and political impacts of the same
vrgedy. Reports by de la Faille affirmed the procedures of the gov-
ernment 
".iiott, 
while Hazeu's report noted contradictory findings.
These two different reports triggered heated debates at the national
level. However, the government eventually, indirectly admitted the
truth of Hazeau's report, by sanctioning some local officers who were
regarded to have been responsible for the tragedy. Vithin this con-
text, the aftermath of the Cimareme tragedy went beyond its locality
as it became a nation-wide concern.
Historical records show that there had been ongoing misery among
the indigenous people. Some resentment had erupted in 'West Java
before the Cimareme tragedy indicated this social situation. Harvest
failures during 1918 had resulted in severe economic conditions for
the Priangan people. The long drought and late rainy season had
brought about crop delays of up to one and half months by the end
of the year. This economic crisis had in turn raised social anxiety and
the frantic situation of worrying about the possibility of famine.
Therefore, the government obliged the farmers to sell their paddy
rice in specific amounts to meet the demand. However, the case of
Cimareme, where the obligation was heavier than in other areas, made
the situation unbearably depressing.
A broader impression of the people's economic situation can be
seen from the food stocks of Javanese society in general. Rice con-
sumption in nineteenth century Java had risen in conjunction with
the growth of the population. As a result, rice production could not
fulfil all the demands. The Javanese population grew from 28,121,000
to 34,433,476 between the years of 1900 and 1920,3e while there was
no significant increase in rice production. On average rice produc-
tion was only 79,880,000 pikul per year at that time.ao This meant
that each individual received only L46,3 kilos of rice per year. At the
same time, legumes and tubers only provided 30 and 33 kilos resPec-
tively for each individual.al
As a consequence of this high population growth, farmers had to
intensify their usage of land. Intensification included, on the one hand,
the use of extensive labor in the process of production and the multi-
plication of planting at the same sites. Planting rice, for instance, was
conducted f,wice, instead of once, a year.a2 Such land usage led to
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unexpected consequences: retardation of fertility, decreasing crops,
increasing plant diseases, which togerher were the main cause of har-
vest failures since the nineteenth century. After 1900, rice produc-
tion could not march the population growth, even though the num-
ber of wet-land farms increased during 18z0-1900 as a resuh of the
national irrigation program.
In order to overcome the food shortage, the colonial government
had actually imported rice from neighboring counrries rrr.h 
", 
Burma,
Thailand or Indo China since 1870. Unfonunately, during l}gl-18g2
harvest failures had swept all areas of North Asia. The same fate oc-
curred again between t9!6 and I9I9, which led to the worsening
economic situation in Indonesia. Apart from harvest failures, there
were also some important factors that made the situation even harder.
Firstly, sea transport was difficult due to the limited number of ships.
This was, in part, a consequence of the outbreak of the World War I.
Secondly, almost all nations in southeast Asia were subject to regula-
tions banning rice exports. As Indonesians were dependent on ex-
ported rice, they were the ones who suffered rhe mosr.a3 They could
not turn to local production since it could not supporr the increasing
demand.
Food shortage occurred again in 1918, when the government could
not handle this problem satisfactorily. unrest about famine spread
widely among society at all levels. In particular in Garur, no rice was
available in the free markets; people had to obtain it from the gov-
ernment office headquarters.aa In this marter, the bupati acted as a
rice trader. Even so, the people still often faced difficulties getting
food supplies; the government was nor always able to provile rice
for the people's demands.as
Proponents of socio-political organizations severely criticized the
inability of the government in handling the food problem. The head
of Sarekat Islam (SI), Tjokroaminoro, and his fellows met the Gover-
nor General in Bogor in 1918 to requesr that the government re-
duced sugar cane plant and increased p^ddy rice farming.a6 The area
of sugar cane planting in Java was abour 21O,OOO bau, some of which
was utilizing wet-rice irrigated land.aT Prioritizing sugar cane plant-
ing, instead of paddy rice, was to become one of the causes of food
shortages. Meanwhile, the government's policy on the intensifica-
tion of legume and tuber planting, in order to diversify food demands,
failed to overcome the shortage.as The average shortage of rice be-
tween I9l4 and t9t7 was about 400,000 rons or 13 per cent of the
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total rice production in Java.ae Unfortunately, the proposal of reduc-
ing sugar cane plants by rp to 50 per cent was not implemented, the
Governor General instead applied a25 per cent reduction. Ironically,
this agreement was still opposed by the capitalists' circle. At the same
time, the motion of reducing sugar plants as proposed by Radicale
Consentratie through its representatives in the Volksraad in Febru-
ary l9t9 failed, being supported by only 10 votes, while 20 votes
opposed it.5o
In general the Priangan people had good economic conditions.
They did not face significant difficulties in making money, whether
by utilizing their own lands or being laborers in commercial agricul-
tural enterprises. The total number of plantations in Priangan was
1,440 while in Garut itself it was 182. Most of these enterprises were
tea, quinine and rubber planting, not to mention cocoa, cotton, co-
conut, pepper and coffee.51 However, small farmers often suffered
from economic crises and were compelled to sell their paddy rice
before the crop was due. This means of selling was called ijon {it.
green), while the buyer was called tukangborongor tukangpak.52 The
government tried to solve this problem by providing small-scale credit
for the farmers, but this went beyond expectations.
Among the crucial problems of Priangan society were land own-
ership and the means of exploitation. Land was mostly owned as
private property; some of it was owned by virtue of turunan (inher-
itance), and some of it was by yasabanda (purchase). Selling inherited
land was not common since Sundanese people were proud of their
land properry. One of the social factors in Priangan society was that
certain official village positions were inherited. Instead of a salary,
the village officers were entitled to a piece of land during their offi-
cial terms. This meant that this kind of land eventually became the
family's property. Therefore, excessive land ownership in Priangan
became a crucial problem among the farmers.5s The goyernment was
not able to prevent such ownership. Many indigenous officers be-
came landlords; they bought land when they still held certain official
positions and they invested it for pension reserves. They usually rented
out their lands at quite high prices, which caused small farmers to
suffer from minimal produce.54
Modest ownership of land was between three to four baus. Land
utilization was usually through renting, crop-sharing or employing
laborers. The rent system using paddy as the means of exchange was
called nglartjak, while that using money was nyeua.This system was
Studia khmiha, Vol.3, No. 2, 1996
Tbe Tragedy of Cimrene
only applied to wet-rice field renting, not to dry land or plantations.s5
The more common system of land production was crop-sharing,
which was applied to all kinds of land. Meanwhile, some landlords
also utilized paid laborers, mostly landless or small farmers, to work
their land.
The relationship between a landlord and his laborer was relatively
permanent, resembling a patron-client relationship. If both parties
received half of the total crop, the system was called neungahkeun or
rnarndro. Land tax was generally the landlords'responsibility, while
the cost of production vras shared by the laborer (panyaanb). An-
other system, called mertelu, pertiga or jujuran, maintained that crop
and producdon cost were to be divided on the basis of two thirds for
the owner and one third for the laborer. Meanwhile, the ceblok sys-
tem determined that the owner received four-fifths, while the laborer
acquired one fifth of the crop. Tax and seeds were provided by the
owner, while the laborer was free to utilize the empry space berween
the main plants, e.g. for fish ponds. However, the most popular sys-
tem of crop sharing in Priangan society w^s rnarnd.ro. In 1900, tax and
production costs generally became the laborer's responsibility.
Paid laborers usually prepared the ground for cultivation, did the
plowing, hoeing and fitting of irrigation. Rice planting and harvest-
ing were mainly done by the women. They worked in the fields
from 6:30 a.m to 10:00 a.m with a salary of 0.20 - 0.30 guilders. 'Women
laborers were considered as equivalent to only one third of men's
services.s6 They also only received a fifth to a third of the total paddy
which they picked in the harvest.
These kinds of land production directly influenced the process of
social stratification. The two general tendencies of the Priangan so-
cial stratum were: village elites and lower stratum, which consisted
of small-scale farmers, paid laborers and so forth. Social stratification
was mainly based on land possession,sT as is common to agrarlan so-
cieties, in which land functioned as a crucial resource. This was ap-
parent in the three detailed categories of Priangan society: indigenous,
newcomers and lodgers (numpang).Indigenous people were called
pribumi, jalrna burni, bumen uantok, kuren tani or tani cebel. They
were the core citizens, the forefathers of whom were the village
founders, and they inherited land and houses. As village members,
they were subjected to government regulations and had full rights
and duties, such as paying tax or contributing unpaid services to the
state. In general, the indigenous people became the backbone of the
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peasant economy and emerged as the elite stratum among the villag-
ers. Meanwhile, the newcomers were commonly called as burnen,
guntai or tatah wadung.People of this c tegory only possessed a piece
of land or a house, not both. The third category was lodgers, which
the Sundanese called u)u@ungdn or batur. They originated from poor
families who gained a living from the juragan (indigenous) as com-
pensation for the services they provided.
Based on such an ownership system, Priangan society recognized
the term tani sentanawhich was attributed to wealthy peasants who
owned huge amounts of land. Various village leadership positions,
such as village head, secret^ry or common officers, were usually held
by people from this c tegory. Hajjis and foais 
-both revered as reli-
gious figures- also fell into this category. They were called theaiengan
stratum who, based on their religious positions, enjoyed particular
respect from the community and were regarded as charismatic lead-
ers. They were rich and their wealth was often more abundant than
the wealth of a village head.58 They had a close relationship with the
common peasants and were not restricted to religious matters.Ajengan
often lent money or paddy seeds to the poor peasants, and in return
they received rice at the time of harvest. Such a relationship caused
the common peasants to be very loyal to the ajengan and to view the
latter as having charismatic authority. As rich people, tani sentana
also became the source of help for most poor peasants, especially at
the time of famine. Therefore, both tani sentana and ajengan people
held responsibiliry for providing living expenses for other people
besides their own families. Meanwhile, their families were generally
extended, in which the members of the family were not confined to
the nuclear members but also included more distant relatives.
The lowest category of the village social strata was landless or
homeless people. Some of them built houses on the land of other
people, especially rich farmers, or lodged with rich families. In ex-
change, they gave their services as maids or paid laborers working on
their employer's land. As paid laborers, usually called panyauab or
pangebon, they were only requested to provide services as the main
capital. Most of them stayed in the houses of rich farmers who guar-
anteed all their living expenses. The main task of these people was to
work in farming areas with payment of 25 gedheng rice per year for
the unskilled and 150 gedhengfor skilled labor.5e As well as farming,
they also had to help their masters with various household duties.
Within this context, the landlords appeared to be patrons who had
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all pervasive influence over the panyateah. At the same time, the lat-
ter had 
^ 
very close personal relationship with the former as mani-
fested in the degree of their loyalty.
Based on this kind of social stratification, small-scale farmers and
paid laborers were the ones who suffered most from the economic
situation at that time. Tani sentana and ajengan, who possessed rela-
tively large amounts of land, could easily overcome harvest failures.
Most of them retained sufficient stocks of either rice or cash. The
number of tani sentana was certainly much lower than the number
of paid laborers or small peasants.
There were at least three factors which caused small peasants to
suffer the most. They did not gain valuable amounts of crop because
of their limited land; their land contributed almost nothing at the
time of harvest failure; and, their dependence on the tani sentana did
not result in sufficient income, since, in such a situation, the latter
prefered to meet their own needs. As a result, people were suscep-
tible to negative feelings, such as anxiety, uncertainty and alienation.
Moreover, the colonial government itself could do nothing to sort
out this very fundamental problem. Such a social fragihty would in-
deed lead to conditions, in which fanaticism and radicalism would
easily emerge. Vithin such a situation, the presence of a central fig-
ure could accelerate the explosion of the whim of the masses. Hence,
it is apparent that such a socio-economic condition might endorse
Haji Hasan's leadership and the ideology of perang sabil.
Ajengan and Formal Leaders
Haji Hasan himself was in the high social straftrm. He was the son
of Kyai Tubagus Alpani, the head of thepesantren (IsLamic traditional
school) in Cimareme. His mother,Jamilah, was the daughter of Raden
Kartaningrat. The mother of Kartaningrat was Gan Ahiyem, while
his father was a dalem or a bupati in Garut. Gan Ahiyem asked for a
divorce and then resided in Cimareme instead of accepting her hus-
band taking a second wife. She sent Kartaningrat to Shaykh Haji
Abdul Mukhyi of Pamijahan, Tasikmalaya, to undertake religious
studies.60 Having succeeded in his studies, Kartaningrat became akyai,
a prominent religious intellectual, and his master renamed him
Kartanuddin. He then returned to Cimareme and set up a pesdntren,
in which he himself was the master. The genealogical tree of Hasan's
father indicated that he was a descendant of the nobility of the Banten
Sultanate. He originated from Banten in the western tip of Java, then
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travelled to Priangan land and married a Cimareme woman. There-
fore, Flasan was a descendant of admirable persons from both sides
of his ancestors. He was heir to the blood of nobility as well as
'ulamA', which thus placed him in a high social stratification rank.
Hasan's early education was as a sa.ntri (student of the pesantren)
at his father's own pesantren. 'Sflhen he reached 15 years of age, he
proceeded to a more advanced pesantren in Pamijahan,
Karangnunggal, Tasikmalaya. Having stayed in this school for five
years, his father asked him to return to Cimareme, even though he
was still willing to stay for a couple of years longer. He was prepared
to lead the pesantren, replacing his father, who was getting on in his
years. F{asan was accompanied by Haji Nur, a close companion of
his father, in running the pesantren. 'When his father died, the
pesantren's activities passed to the hands of Haji Nur, because Hasan
himself paid greater attention to deepening his knowledge about
mysticism and magic.6r
Hasan taught this knowledge to the students of the Cimareme
pesantren. Apart from this, the students were also trained in the skill
of martial arts by his close friend, Haji Makbul of Rancabango. These
skills and knowledge were also compulsory for all members of his
family. To organize this activity, Hasan set up a new organization
called Pencak Silat Gerak Cepat (it. High Response Martial Art).
The organization was led by Haji Gadjali of Cikajang and Haji Sobandi
of Rancabango, who later became Hasan's sons-in-law. The popular-
ity of the Cimareme pesantren was evident, since the number of stu-
dents was more than a thousand in t9I2. They came not only from
the surrounding areas of the Garut district, but also from other areas
in Java. F{asan appeared not only to insist on the significance of reli-
gious knowledge, but also the meaning of physical defense. On this
basis of this frame of thought, Hasan also introduced another organi-
z tion, Kumpulan Voetbal Merdeka Tani (lit. Free Peasants' Foot-
ball Association), which was devoted to his fellow villagers.
These organizations became effective instruments for the dissemi-
nation of the influence of the Cimareme pesantren.62 Hasan's posi-
tion was growing stronger as the number of his followers was in-
creasing all the time. They provided a source of legitimation for
Hasan's leadership and social mobilization for the proposed activi-
ties. In fact, the pesantren community not only provided social sup-
port, but, through religious language, also strengthened the position
of Hasan's leadership. This was proven by the effectiveness of the
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ideology of perangsabilinthe fanatic attitude of Hasan's followers in
the Cimareme tragedy. They did not regard their conflict against the
colonial government as merely economic or political in character,
but also religious. In other words, their militant attitude was more to
do with religious sentiment than economic disappointment or politi-
cal friction.
Haji Hasan had expressed his hatred of the Dutch colonial gov-
ernment since he was young. His father was always insistent on avoid-
ing any kind of cooperation with the colonials. Hasan himself be-
came involved in a conflict with a Dutch controller, when the
Cimareme people were forced to work for the government, building
a road between Sindanglangon and Cibudug. He was irritated by the
rude attitude of the controller towards the indigenous citizens. On
another occasion, he also rejected the government's offer of a posi-
tion as a formal religious leader in the local office.63 Such a rude re-
sponse was very unlikely from lay people. Those who were economi-
cally and politically dependent upon the government would at least
have made certain compromises. However, Hasan, with the social
support that he had, whether on the basis of his traditional status or
his leadership capabiliry, could state his rejection and resistance to-
wards the powerful colonial government.
Apart from his position as a member of the elite and a religious
leader, Hasan also had pervasive influence over the people who
worked on his lands.6a He was a member of Goena Perlaja, a revolu-
tionary movement, led by Kyai Abdullah of Tegalgubuk, Cirebon.
This organizationwas assumed to have a close relationship with some
proponents of radical political and social movements, such as
Surjopranoto of the Adhi Darma organization, Semaun of ISDV[],
Alimin and Abdul Muis of the Batavia branch of Syarikat Islam (SI 
-Islamic Association).65 It is understandable then if the colonial gov-
ernment was suspicious of Hasan's influence over the indigenous
people.
In economic terms, Flasan was well off. His land was abundant,
more than ten baus, which was planted with paddy rice and tobacco.
Such a huge amount of land could produ ce 250 pikul of paddy rice or
more than 15 tons each harvest. His tobacco, "Bako Cimareme"
(Cimareme tobacco), was known to be of high quality. Meanwhile,
Flasan was also well-known as a talented horse farmer. The bupati of
Garut, R.A.A. \Tiratanudatar (1871-1916), often bought tobacco and
horses from Hasan's farm. This farmine business caused Hasan to
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became a close friend of Dr. Hubenet, a veterinarian, from Bandung,
'West 
Java. Hasan's friendship with Hubenet was because of his farm-
ing, although the horses themselves were a source of prestige. Apart
from horses, Hasan also owned a fishery which resulted in a large
harvest every six months. Last but not least, he also owned a coconut
plantation of more than 500 trees which provided him with very
significant income. This enormous amount of wealth must have af-
firmed Hasan's leadership. In other words, Hasan's property could
easily ensure the loyalty of his followers in the implementation of
his progressive ideas.
The government regulation on rice compelled Hasan to sell about
4A pihul or 2.4 tons of his paddy rice. Although he understood the
government's intention in issuing such a regulation, he still felt bur-
dened by the amount of paddy rice that he had to surrender. The
main reason for his objection was that, though he was wealthy, he
felt responsible for financing the 84 members of his family. He also
had to provide for the economic demands of his laborers who planted
his fields. Therefore, he was only able to sell about tenpikul of rice to
the government. He felt that this amount was modest and in line
with the government regulation that was applied in other areas.
The obligation of selling paddy rice in such a bad economic situa-
tion automatically threatened the peasants' life, because of the de-
creasing rice production. In response, Hasan, as a charismatic leader,
felt responsible for ensuring the survival of his community. The situ-
ation became more complicated when the uedzna of Leles threat-
ened to seize Hasan's property, which was in fact not basic govern-
ment policy, should he resist the government regulation. Such a
rude attitude made Hasan even more stubborn and his followers more
militant, which in turn triggered the Cimareme tragedy. The out-
burst had already happened, even though the government fired the
utedana of Leles on the eve of the Cimareme tragedy, 5 July t979.66
The conflict becween the people and indigenous officers was not a
new issue. This problem arose as a logical consequence of the politi-
cal polity that existed at that time. Indigenous officers were expected
to be able to bridge the relationship berween the colonial govern-
ment and the indigenous people. Such an expectation was, however,
difficult to meet, since the aspirations of the people were not always
in accordance with government policies and vice versa. \Within such
a context, the indigenous officers prefered to be on the side of gov-
ernment interests as they were very dependent on the government's
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power. This was a common tendency and had been happening for
iome times so many conflicts did not involve only two parties, the
government and indigenous people, but also the third party of the
indigenous officers.
The problem became more knotry with the existence of dualism
of leadeiship at the village level. The colonial government officially
appointed cirtain village elite people to posts in the local administra-
tive poliry as its representatives. However, not all the elites held these
posiaions, especially those who were higher religious elites or spiri
iual leaders. In fact, the latter group had a pervasive influence on the
people and were closely attached to them as they often created their
t*r, .o--uniry through the establishment of pesantren. They were
economically well off and could also be classified as an elite stratum
in a broader sense. Their informal pattern of leadership engendered a
closer and a more emotional relationship with the lay people, while
the formal leaders tended to have a formal relationship. Moreover,
the position of formal leadership was based more on government
legitimation rather than on recognition by the people. This leader-
ship dualism could, at tirnes, create sharp friction. The Cimareme
tragedy exemplified clear evidence of the political friction within
the pattern of leadership at the village level.
Closing Notes
The wider context of the Cimareme tragedy reveals the common
socio-economic condition of the Javanese people at the beginning of
the twentieth century. The economic problems of local people ap-
peared to be an inseparable part of the same problem faced by thej"'rr".r.t" in general. Harvest failures caused by long droughts, epi-
demic plant diseases and intensification of land use 'were common
phenomena in all areas of Java. It was evident that the problem con-
cerning the basic demands of the people became a common denomi-
nator for the increase in social protests. Although Protest movements
might, in their mature Process, might adopt various forms, arguably,
economic interest was still the dominant motiYation for the crystalli-
z^tiofi of such events. It was also predictable that economic motives
also enabled the success of social mobilization among Peasant com-
munities. This was especially so for those who lived at a subsistence
level; the peasant community suffered the most. Therefore, within
the contexi of the Cimareme tragedy, the regulation on rice buying was
only a trigger in a bad situation that had been ongoing for some time'
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Social unrest in the lower social strara was unlikely to be suffi-
cient to result in the emergence of social protest. Vithin the context
of the Cimareme tragedy, for example, the peasants, who suffered
the most from the rice regulation, tended to be submissive before
government policy. They expressed their aspirations only in terms
of support and attention to Hasan's atritude, even though the latter
did not experience the same fate as theirs. To a large extent, there-
fore, Hasan's position became crucial in motivating the realization
of such a protest. In economic terms, Hasan could not be classified in
the peasant stratum, but his position before the officers made him a
peer of this unfortunate community. In the end he not only emerged
as the leader of this group but also as a facilitaror ro express rhe
peasants' aspirations.
Of course Hasan's tough line against the government was also
sustained by other factors. As a religious leader, he had good commu-
nication with his people through religious language. The idea of perang
sabil, which then became the main ideology of the movement,
strengthened the pervasive influence of Hasan's leadership and, at
the same time, affirmed his self-reliance. His position as a traditional
elite member also enabled him able to lead the people and to face
local officers as well as rhe colonial officers. There were ar least uwo
possible answers to the conflict between Hasan and local officers.
Such a conflict could firstly be understood as the result of village
elites' rivalry, in which each party had a different source of legitima-
tion. However, this might also merely be a reflection of a wider con-
flict berween the colonized and the colonial, which took its form in
local events. Indigenous officers were only the object of the people's
loathing of the colonial government. Only their limited sources of
power and weapons made them unable to directly face the unbeat-
able and powerful colonial arms.
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